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Sharing Digital Rights with Domain Licensing∗
Nicholas Paul Sheppard Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
November 10, 2006
Abstract
Sharing of multimedia content is a common practice
that, combined with appropriate business models,
need not be detrimental to the interests of content
providers. Existing digital rights management sys-
tems, however, support only relatively limited shar-
ing of content between multimedia terminals, result-
ing in inconvenience and frustration for end-users of
rights-managed content. In this paper, we propose to
combine the notion of an “authorised domain” with
an “environment role” to permit end-users to share
access to multimedia content within the constraints
expressed in a domain licence. We describe how a
variety of different business models can be supported
using domain licences, and propose a preliminary do-
main expression language in which licences can be
written. Finally, we demonstrate the practicality of
our model by outlining how it could be implemented
using the Open Mobile Alliance’s specification for au-
thorised domains together with a ubiquitous com-
puting network. Our proposal provides greater ex-
pressive power than the base OMA DRM framework
without requiring users to upgrade their devices.
1 Introduction
The increasing availability of network technologies
has made electronic distribution an attractive mode
of distribution for multimedia content due to the con-
∗ c©ACM, 2006. This is the author’s version of this paper. It
is posted here by permission of the ACM for your personal use.
Not for re-distribution. The definitive version was published
in the ACM Workshop on Multimedia Content Protection and
Security 2006.
venience and low cost of copying and distributing
digital multimedia. However, this convenience ap-
plies equally to legitimate and illegitimate distribu-
tion channels, and fears of widespread copyright in-
fringement and other missues of multimedia content
are often blamed for the slow uptake of electronic
distribution by content owners.
Digital rights management (“DRM”) allows con-
tent owners to control and monitor the distribution
of multimedia content through electronic channels us-
ing a machine-enforceable licence. Content owners’
fears of widespread copyright violation via electronic
distribution have seen digital rights management be-
come a fast-growing field of research and development
in recent years, and a number of systems are now
commercially available.
Digital rights management systems, however, do
not always provide end-users of multimedia content
with the experience they have come to expect from
older models of multimedia distribution. In par-
ticular, while many modern digital rights manage-
ment systems allow some restricted sharing of con-
tent amongst a small group of multimedia terminals,
these systems lack the simplicity and flexibility for-
merly offered by physical media that could be eas-
ily transported between terminals, swapped amongst
friends, stored in libraries, and so on.
In this paper, we propose a model for sharing ac-
cess to multimedia content based on context-aware
access control and the authorised domain concept
proposed by the Open Mobile Alliance [20], Digital
Video Broadcasting Project [10] and others. Our
model allows access to multimedia content to be
shared amongst a pool of users and devices, within
limits defined by the content provider and enforced
c©ACM, 2006
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by a context-aware access control system.
We will give an overview of existing proposals for
authorised domains and context-aware access control
in Section 2, then describe our rights-sharing model
in Section 3. Our model augments the authorised
domain concept with a domain licence that controls
the form of a domain. A domain licence sets out
the contexts in which a terminal may be a member
of a domain and therefore have access to the pool
of content belonging to that domain. Domains can
be set up, for example, to encompass a household, a
sporting event, or the set of devices belonging to a
user.
We will describe how our model maps to a vari-
ety of sharing scenarios in Section 4, and derive the
context information required to implement these sce-
narios. We will then propose a preliminary domain
expression language in Section 5 that can be used
for writing domain licences supporting our example
scenarios and others.
Finally, we demonstrate the practicality of our
model by outlining how it could be implemented us-
ing the Open Mobile Alliance’s digital rights man-
agement specification in Section 6. Our proposal
greatly increases the expressive power of OMA’s dig-
ital rights management framework without requiring
an upgrade to end-user devices.
2 Previous Work
2.1 Authorised Domains
Many existing digital rights management systems
recognise that users typically have more than one
terminal with which they would like to access their
content, and support some primitive method of shar-
ing content amongst a small group of terminals. The
Digital Video Broadcasting (“DVB”) Project [10], Se-
cure Video Processor (“SVP”) Alliance [25], Open
Mobile Alliance (“OMA”) [20] and Marlin Developer
Community [15], for example, all intend for their con-
tent protection standards to incorporate “authorised
domains”, that is, collections of terminals that have
access to a particular pool of content.
Schemes for authorised domains proposed by Mar-
lin, OMA, TIRAMISU [16], Popescu, et al. [22] and
Sovio, et al. [26] have domains being defined by some
device or Internet service that we will refer to as being
the domain controller. A terminal may join a domain
by contacting the domain controller that created the
domain and, once it has done so, it can access content
that belongs to the domain.
None of these schemes, however, define the method
by which the domain controller decides whether or
not to allow a terminal to join a domain. In this pa-
per, we propose a model in which a domain controller
can be provided with a description of a domain that
it will use to determine which terminals should be
members of that domain. We will outline how this
model could be implemented using OMA domains in
Section 6.
Authorised domain systems proposed by IBM [21],
Thomson [1] and the SVP Alliance [25] allow devices
to be joined to a domain up until a limit on the size
of the domain is reached. Koster, et al. [13] and the
Marlin specification hint at the notion of a domain
licence (called a “domain policy”) used in this paper,
but support only simple policies based on the do-
main’s size and the proximity of the proposed mem-
ber to the domain controller. These simple policies
may be sufficient in the household sharing applica-
tions for which these systems are designed. However,
this model does not seem sufficient for all kinds of
domains and in this paper we propose a much more
complete method of defining domains.
Reddy, et al. [23] describe a system in which groups
of users are defined by lists of individual users main-
tained by a licence device (that is, “rights issuer”
in the terminology used by this paper). In order to
obtain access to a particular object, a user must con-
tact the licence device in order to check that he or
she is on the list of people permitted to access this
object. This procedure is used by Microsoft’s Rights
Management Services [18]. In the model used in this
paper, a single licence may be shared by a collection
of devices without each one needing to contact the
rights issuer individually.
c©ACM, 2006
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2.2 Context-Aware Access Control
This paper proposes to use context information about
a multimedia terminal in order to determine whether
or not it should be permitted to join a domain. Many
“context-aware” access control systems have been
developed for ubiquitous computing applications in
which access to some resource depends on context in-
formation. Context-aware access control models can
be divided into two kinds:
• models in which context information is checked
as an additional component of an access control
rule [9, 5, 8]; and
• models in which context information is used to
permit activation of an “environment role” to
which permissions are assigned [6, 24, 2, 11].
The approach used by digital rights management pol-
icy languages such as the Open Digital Rights Lan-
guage (“ODRL”) [19] and MPEG Rights Expression
Language (“MPEG REL”) [12] can be thought of as
an example of the former kind. In these languages,
access to a resource can be made conditional upon
a variety of context information including time and
location.
In this paper, however, we propose to make mem-
bership of an authorised domain akin to membership
of an environment role. This approach allows context
information to be processed by a relatively powerful
central domain controller while individual terminals
need only know how to join and leave a domain and
perform a few relative basic cryptographic functions.
In particular, sophisticated context-aware constraints
can be supported using legacy terminals that do not
otherwise support such constraints.
Unlike environment roles, however, membership of
our authorised domains is not automatic upon sat-
isfying some context. In general, membership must
be further authorised by a domain controller. This
allows content users to control which terminals enter
their domains within the constraints imposed by the
content provider. For example, if a content provider
has limited the size of an authorised domain to ten
terminals, the domain controller may choose which
ten terminals these are and need not simply take the




















Figure 1: A typical digital rights management system
3 Sharing Digital Rights with
Domain Licensing
3.1 Traditional Digital Rights Man-
agement
Figure 1 shows the architecture of a typical digital
rights management system. Content is created by a
content provider, and transmitted in a protected (for
example, encrypted) form to a content user via some
distribution channel. In order to access the protected
data, the user must obtain a licence from the rights
issuer.
Licences are written in a machine-readable rights
expression language that sets out the terms of use of
the data and the information required to access the
protected content. In the model proposed by Guth,
et al. [7], a licence is composed of a collection of
licence objects of one of five types:
Resource. A unique object associated with some
identifiers.
Subject. A party to the licence, being either a
rights-holder who owns the rights over a re-
source, or a beneficiary to whom rights to ac-
cess a resource can be granted. Each subject is
associated with a unique identifier.
Role. A group to which subjects may belong and to
which permissions may be assigned, as in role-
based access control.
c©ACM, 2006


























Figure 2: A licence allowing Alice
Jones to play ten video trailers from
http://www.videos.com.au/trailers
Permission. The right to perform a particular op-
eration on a resource.
Constraint. A conditional expression that must be
satisfied in order for some permission to be ex-
ercised.
A licence is an aggregation of permissions awarded
by some rights-holder to some beneficiary. Licences
can only be issued on the authority of the rights-
holder and contain the information required to de-
crypt the protected form of the resource specified in
the licence. A (simplified) example of a licence writ-
ten in the Open Digital Rights Language [19] is shown
in Figure 2.
The fundamental security requirement of a digi-
tal rights management system is that terminals be
guaranteed by their manufacturers to behave in ac-
cordance with licence documents. For the purposes
of this paper, a terminal is an abstract single-user
multimedia player, editor, etc. that may be imple-
mented as a hardware device, a software application
or combination of the two. Note that, on a multi-
user device such as a mainframe computer, it may
be possible for two or more software terminals to be
concurrently executing on the same machine and it is
important that two such terminals be considered as
independent entities.
When a user (beneficiary) wishes to perform some
particular operation on a particular resource, the ter-
minal checks that the user possesses a licence grant-
ing that permission, and that any constraints associ-
ated with the permission are satisfied. If the permis-
sion does not exist, or the constraints are not satis-
fied, the terminal will refuse to carry out the opera-
tion. Otherwise, the terminal will retrieve the content
key and carry out the desired operation.
Licences will only be accepted by the terminal if
they are signed by a valid rights issuer recognised by
the terminal. Rights issuers only generate licences
according to some policy set by the relevent con-
tent provider; for example, users must pay a certain
amount of money in order to obtain a licence for a
particular item of content.
3.2 Domains
We call the fundamental sharing mechanism in our
model a domain, as in other work. A domain is an
arbitrary collection of terminals. A domain may be
created by anyone, and all authority to manage the
domain and issue resource licences for it is derived
from the creator of the domain.
The beneficiary of a resource licence is a domain.
Any terminal that is a member of the beneficiary
domain of a resource licence may exercise the per-
missions granted by the licence, subject to any con-
straints specified by the licence.
Every terminal is a member of a unit domain,
which is the domain containing that terminal and
no other. The universal domain is the domain that
contains all terminals that are compliant with the
digital rights management regime. A terminal may
c©ACM, 2006
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be the member of an arbitrary number of domains
simultaneously, so long as it satisfies the criteria for
belonging to all of those domains.
3.3 Domain Licences
A domain licence is a licence that sets out the terms
under which a terminal may be a member of a do-
main. As for resource licences, domain licences may
only be issued on the authority of the creator of the
target domain. Following the model of Guth, et al.
for resource licences, a domain licence is composed of
a collection of licence objects:
Target Domain. The domain whose membership is
controlled by the licence, analogous to the re-
source in a resource licence.
Beneficiary Domain. The domain whose members
are permitted to make terminals a member of the
target domain, analogous to the beneficiary in a
resource licence.
Membership Criterion. A conditional expression
that must be satisfied in order for a terminal
to be an active member of the target domain,
loosely analogous to the constraint in a resource
licence. Note that satisfaction of the member-
ship criterion may not automatically confer do-
main membership on a terminal; the terminal
must still obtain approval from a member of the
beneficiary domain (which, in general, may be
refused).
Domain licences are written in a domain expression
language analogous to the rights expression language
used to express resource licences. As for resource
licences, domain licences must only by accepted by
a domain controller if they are signed by a domain
creator recognised by the domain controller. We will
consider domain expression languages in more detail
in Section 5.
3.4 Sharing Constraints
Constraints in both resource and domain licences
may be stateful or stateless. Stateless constraints are
constraints whose applicability can be checked with-
out any memory of previous operations on the asso-
ciated resource; for example, a constraint specifying
a time interval during which the resource can be ac-
cessed is stateless. Stateless constraints in domains
behave in the same way as they do in traditional dig-
ital rights management.
Stateful constraints are constraints whose applica-
bility can only be checked with reference to state in-
formation that is updated every time an operation is
performed on the resource. For example, a constraint
that specifies the number of times that a resource can
be used is stateful. We identify two ways in which
stateful constraints can be applied in domains:
Shared. Each domain has a global state that is af-
fected by the actions of all of the members of
the domain. For example, a domain has a pool
of credit that is consumed whenever any member
of the domain uses a resource.
Unshared. Each member of the domain maintains
state information independently of all other
members of the domain. Each member’s state
information is affected only by the actions of that
member. For example, each member of the do-
main may use a resource once.
Both types of stateful constraint seem useful. Ev-
ery instance of a stateful constraint in a shareable
digital rights management system will therefore be
associated with a “shared” flag indicating whether
or not this constraint is to be applied relative to the
state information held in common by the beneficiary
domain, or by the particular domain member that
exercises the associated permission. Constraints in
the Open Digital Rights Language, for example, are
shared by default but the language also supports an
attribute called forEachMember that indicates that
the associated constraint is unshared.
The introduction of domains allows the introduc-
tion of new kinds of stateful resource constraints in
which the “state” refers to some state of the domain
itself. For example, there may be a limit on the num-
ber of domain members permitted to access a partic-
ular resource at any one time. We will refer to these
kinds of contraints as domain-state constraints.
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3.5 Retention
If a domain criterion specified in a domain licence
ceases to be satisfied, the terminal must leave the
target domain. When a terminal leaves a domain, the
terminal becomes a lapsed member of that domain.
Lapsed members may not exercise any permissions
granted to the domain.
Every domain may be associated with some state
information, including stateful resource constraints
and stateful domain membership criteria. Lapsed
members must continue to store any state informa-
tion associated with the domain, and re-activate this
information should they re-join the domain at a later
date. This prevents dishonest users from resetting
state information by artificially causing their termi-
nals to leave and re-join a domain.
A real terminal will eventually run out of space if
it joins many domains that require it to store state
information indefinitely. In order to allow terminals
to reclaim storage space used by ephemeral domain
memberships, a domain licence may contain a reten-
tion criterion. The retention criterion is a conditional
expression that, if satisfied, requires a lapsed member
of the associated domain to retain the state informa-
tion related to that domain. Conversely, if the reten-
tion criterion ceases to be satisfied, a lapsed member
of the domain may delete the state information. We
will refer to this operation as deletion of a domain.
4 Sharing Scenarios
We will now consider some example scenarios for
sharing digital resources. It is not practical to de-
scribe every conceivable scenario in which resources
might be shared here, but we have attempted to de-
sign a variety of representative and realistic scenarios.
We will show how these scenarios can be mapped to
our model of sharing and identify the context infor-
mation required to implement these models of shar-
ing. This context information will need to be sup-
ported by the domain expression language we will
outline in Section 5, and the implementation we will
outline in Section 6.
4.1 Social Sharing
CDs, DVDs and the like are commonly shared
amongst social networks as a means of socialisation
and exploring new music and film [3]. We are not
aware of any model of a social network that would
be meaningful to a computer. However, a simple but
useful model might be to associate every human user
with an acquaintance domain, membership of which
is controlled by some device or set of devices owned
by that user. Another device may be a member of a
user’s acquaintance domain if the owner of the device
is acquainted in some sense with the owner of the ac-
quaintance domain. “Acquaintance” can be defined
in a variety of ways, including
• allowing each user to nominate a fixed number
of acquainted devices;
• fixing the maximum number of acquaintance do-
mains that any one device can be a member of;
• requiring an acquainted device to be in fre-
quent close physical proximity to the domain
controller; or
• by referring to registered relationships such as
employment or marriage.
Context Required. The number of terminals in a
domain; the number of domains of a particular type
of which a terminal is a member; physical location;
external relationships.
4.2 Site Licensing
Many software vendors provide site licensing pack-
ages that allow businesses and other institutions to
make a software package available to its employees.
In our model, the software vendor would issue a do-
main licence for a domain whose membership de-
pends on whether or not the proposed member be-
longs to the organisation. This domain licence might
be issued to a software server that acts as the domain
controller for the domain. Machines that belong to
the organisation might be
• listed explicitly in the domain licence;
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• identified by their membership of the organisa-
tion’s local area network;
• identified by their physical location within the
organisation’s offices;
• identified by some combination of the above
three; or
• the domain licence might simply limit the num-
ber of terminals on which the software can be
installed.
Context Required. The number of terminals in a
domain; physical location; network location; machine
identity.
4.3 Household Sharing
Consider a family household. Systems such as those
described in Section 2 are designed to implement
sharing amongst all of the members of a household
by creating a domain containing all of the terminals
in the household. Resource licences are then issued
to this domain.
Using domain licences, it is possible to control
membership of the household domain in a more so-
phisticated way than by simply placing an upper limit
on the number of terminals that can be in a house-
hold. A household can be defined by the building it
occupies; by a role containing all of the members of
the family; or by the local area network within the
household. A device fixed within the home such as a
set-top box or media centre PC might act as a domain
controller.
Sub-role domains (corresponding to sub-roles) can
be used within the household to restrict access to ma-
terial (such as personal photo collections) that is pri-
vate to one member of the household, or to material
(such as violent or pornographic material) that may
not be appropriate for all members of the household.
Context Required. Membership of a super-domain;
physical location; network location; user identity and
role.
4.4 Club Sharing
Consider a film club. Club members pay a subcrip-
tion fee to the club that allows them to download
films from a group of libraries with whom the club
has an agreement. Membership of the club can be
seen as equivalent to membership of a domain whose
membership criterion contains a payment predicate.
Furthermore, suppose the club organises monthly
public screenings in which films are projected onto a
large screen in an open field. Patrons – who may or
may not be club members – may watch the film from
their cars in a carpark at the back of the field, or sit
on the grass nearer to the screen. To avoid upsetting
the surrounding residences, however, the “cinema” is
not equipped with loudspeakers.
The soundtrack for the film is available via a wire-
less network created by the film projector. In order to
listen to the soundtrack, patrons must connect to the
network using their own terminals (such as in-car and
handheld players). The soundtrack is made available
to a domain, of which patrons’ terminals can become
members by contacting a domain controller hosted
alongside the film projector.
In order to recover the costs of hiring the field and
showing the film, the club sells access to the sound-
track domain. Patrons who are not club members
must pay a surcharge that the club keeps and uses to
buy new equipment, etc. The soundtrack domain can
be implemented using two domain licences, one that
requires the target terminals to already be a mem-
ber of the club’s domain, and another that anyone
can join. The former licence requires the payment
due from club members, while the latter requires the
payment due from non-members.
Context Required. Membership of a super-domain;
physical location; payment.
5 A Domain Expression Lan-
guage
The power and flexibility of our model depends to a
large extent on the expressiveness of the domain ex-
pression language in use – the universe of domains
that can be supported by our model is governed by
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the expressiveness of the domain membership crite-
rion.
Covington, et al. [6] use a Prolog-based language
to describe the activation conditions for environment
roles, but do not specify the fundamental predicates
from which environment roles can be built in their
system. That is, they define the syntax of the lan-
guage but do not define a specific vocabulary of cri-
teria that can be used to define environment roles.
Masone proposes a “role definition language” based
on mathematical set notation, SQL and C [17]. Ma-
sone’s language is bound to a ubiquitous computing
system known as “Solar” [4] in which sensors trans-
mit a series of events to other nodes in the network.
Masone’s language allows a security designer to spec-
ify a collection of sets (some of which represent envi-
ronment roles) that are updated whenever a security-
sensitive event occurs. Writing role definitions for a
particular network appears to require detailed knowl-
edge of the network that is unlikely to be available to
the author of a domain licence.
In digital rights management applications, it needs
to be possible for a content provider to describe a do-
main in broad but unambiguous terms that can be in-
terpreted for any network in which the content might
be used. Individual networks may use approaches
similar to those of Covington, et al. or Masone to
check the predicates of a domain expression language
such as “terminal X is located in room Y ” or “user
A is logged on to terminal B”; we will consider this
further when we outline a possible implementation in
Section 6.
In this section, we will present a preliminary do-
main expression language based on our observations
about domain licensing in the foregoing sections. The
syntax and vocabulary of our language is based on
that of the Open Digital Rights Language [19], which
is used as the rights expression language in OMA’s
digital rights management system. Other syntax and
vocabulary could be used though we expect the dif-
ferences would be largely cosmetic.
ODRL, and our domain expression language, are
based on XML. We will call the root element of
a domain licence rights, as in ODRL. Each do-
main licence may contain one or more agreement el-
ements that describe an agreement between the con-
tent provider and the beneficiary domain for oper-
ating a domain. Each agreement contains an ele-
ment party identifying the beneficiary domain; an
element target identifying the target domain; an el-
ement membership identifying the membership crite-
rion and, optionally, an element retention identify-
ing the retention criterion. For simplicity, we do not
consider an equivalent of the ODRL offer or revoke
elements in this paper.
5.1 Beneficiary and Target Domains
Domains can be identified using a uid (“unique iden-
tifier”) element within the party and target ele-
ments using the context element. Any method of
generating a unique identifier is suitable.
5.2 Membership and Retention Crite-
ria
Both the membership and retention criteria may con-
tain an arbitrary number of elements representing
one predicate of the criterion. If every predicate
contained by the criterion is true, then the criterion
is satisfied. Disjunctive relationships between predi-
cates can be expressed by using multiple agreement
elements with the same beneficiary and target do-
mains, but different membership and retention cri-
teria. Predicates can be negated by enclosing them
within the not element.
Most predicates are likely to be useful for express-
ing both membership and retention criteria, and we
will allow the use of the same set of elements within
both criteria. For clarity, we will give an interpreta-
tion of each predicate in both contexts.
We will refer to a terminal that is being considered
for membership of a domain as the target terminal.
Membership and retention criteria will be evaluated
against the context of the target terminal.
5.2.1 Simple Criteria.
Many of the context elements identified in Section 4
represent simple concepts such as size and location.
While implementing a system for securely checking
these criteria may be non-trivial, a variety of systems
c©ACM, 2006
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for doing so have been described in the literature and
we will not consider the detail of these systems in this
paper. Many of these concepts are represented by
elements in ODRL that we will adopt in our domain
expression language. We also adopt a few elements
of ODRL that, though they do not appear in any
of our scenarios, seem useful to express widely-used
concepts such as expiry dates.
Accumulated. Terminals may only accumulate a
given amount of time as a member of the tar-
get domain; or, must retain the domain until a
given amount of time has been accumulated as
a lapsed member.
Count. The number of terminals in the domain
must not exceed a given value. This seems useful
only as a membership criterion.
DateTime. Terminals may only be a member of
the domain during a given time period; or, may
delete the domain once a given time has passed.
Network. Members must be located within a given
computer network; or, must retain the domain
until they have left the given network.
Spatial. Members must be physically located within
a given spatial region; or, must retain the domain
until leaving the given region.
Payment. A fee must be paid in order to add mem-
bers or to delete a domain.
Tracked. Every join operation or domain deletion
will be logged.
5.2.2 Domain Criteria.
The domain predicate is true if the target terminal is
a member of the domain specified by the context el-
ement within the domain element. This predicate can
be used to create hierarchical domains in which the
target domain is a sub-domain of the domain iden-
tified by the domain predicate, and also to create
mutual exclusion relationships between domains by
negating the domain constraint.
Domains may belong to a domain class such as per-
sonal domains and acquaintance domains. It is often
useful to create mutual exclusion relationships be-
tween domains of one class such as “a terminal may
be a member of at most one personal domain at a
time” or “a terminal may be a member of at most
ten acquaintance domains at a time”. This can be
expressed conveniently in a predicate class-multi-
plicity that contains the maximum number of do-
mains of that class that a terminal may be a member
of at any one time.
Note that these semantics make it possible for one
domain licence to cap multiplicity of a domain class
to one number, and another licence to cap multi-
plicity of the same domain class to another number.
Hence, it may be possible for a terminal to belong to
a larger number of domains of the same class if one
set of licences is exercised as compared to another set
for the same domain class. This may confuse users
and it would be possible to prohibit such a state of
affairs (for example) by requiring that each domain
be controlled by only one licence, but we leave it up
to domain designers to develop good policies for their
applications.
5.2.3 Role Criteria.
Human users may occupy roles in the sense of a role-
based access control system. We assume that ter-
minals have some method of authenticating their hu-
man users that is beyond the scope of this paper, and
similarly of checking whether or not the user is the
member of a particular role.
A role domain is a domain whose membership de-
pends on the current human user of the terminal.
That is, a terminal may only be a member of a role
domain if its current user is a member of the corre-
sponding role. As in ODRL, we use the group pred-
icate to express this in a membership criterion.
The universal role (domain) is the role (domain)
containing all humans, and every user has his or her
own unit role (domain) that contains that user and
no other. We will also sometimes refer to the unit
role domain of a particular user as being his or her
personal domain; personal domains are very similar
to the “personal entertainment domain” proposed by
Koster, et al. [13] and contain all of the devices used
by a particular human user. As in ODRL, the ind-
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Figure 3: A domain licence for an acquaintance do-
main.
ividual predicate can be used to refer to a single
human user, that is, the owner of a unit role.
5.3 Examples
Figures 3 and 4 show examples of domain licences
written in our domain expression language. We have
omitted the signatures on these licences for brevity;
the licence of Figure 3 would probably be signed
by some authority recognised by all of the content
providers who use the system, while the licence of
Figure 4 might be signed by the film’s distributor.
Figure 3 shows a licence that allows Alice’s do-
main controller (alice:controller) to make an-
other terminal a member of Alice’s acquaintance do-
main (alice:acquaintance). The incoming device
must not be a member of more than nine acquain-
tance domains already, and may delete the domain if
it spends more than thirty days outside the domain.
Figure 4 shows a licence implementing one case of
the club sharing scenario described in Section 4.4.
Here, club members’ terminals are assumed to be
members of a domain called myfilms. The domain
controller myfilms:controller may join a mem-
ber of the myfilms domain to a sub-domain called
myfilms:2006:2, which is the domain used for the
second film session of the year 2006. In order to be
permitted to join the sub-domain, terminals must be
located in Oak Tree Park and must pay three dol-
lars. Since the domain only exists for the showing of
the film, terminals may delete it from their memories
once the film has concluded.
6 Implementation Using OMA
Domains
We will now outline how the model described in
Section 3 can be implemented using OMA domains.
OMA DRM provides a specification for devices (prin-
cipally, mobile phones) that can be members of do-
mains and make use of content granted to those do-
mains, but does not specify how the domains them-
selves are governed.
OMA DRM supports two kinds of rights objects
(resource licences), which we will refer to as device
rights objects and domain rights objects. The rights
given in a device rights object may only be exercised
by the device identified in that rights object, whereas
the rights given in a domain rights object may be
exercised by any member of the domain specified in
the rights object.
Rights objects of either kind can be issued by rights
issuers. Rights issuers are also responsible for deter-
mining whether or not a device is permitted to join
a domain. In general, rights issuers may create and
manage domains according to their own whims.
For the present purposes, however, we consider a
special kind of rights issuer, called a domain con-
troller, that manages domains according to domain
licences issued to it by some master rights issuer that
creates those domains. Domain controllers must meet
tamper-resistance requirements comparable to those
met by end-user devices that guarantee that they will
behave in accordance with the licences they have been
given. Every domain must have exactly one domain
controller, but a single domain controller may man-
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Figure 4: A domain licence for club members.
age an arbitrary number of domains.
Domain controllers and master rights issuers both
implement the role of a rights issuer in the proto-
cols described by OMA. Master rights issuers, how-
ever, are additionally permitted to issue domain li-
cences to domain controllers using a trivial variation
of OMA’s Rights Object Acquisition Protocol. Do-
main controllers are permitted to execute OMA’s pro-
tocols with end-user devices only in accordance with
licences that have been issued by the master rights
issuer.
Domain controllers are required to be able to access
relevent context information about the devices that
may join their domains, and be able to verify that this
information is correct. Numerous methods for ob-
taining context information have been developed by
the ubiquitous computing community, though not all
of them were designed with security in mind. In this
paper, we adopt the model used by Masone [17] and
assume that the domain controller receives a trusted
series of events describing context changes.
For every domain that it controls, the domain con-
troller maintains a set of devices that satisfy the
membership criterion of that domain. The termi-
nals in this set may or may not be actual domain
members. Whenever a context event is received, the
domain controller updates the sets according to some
event handler.
If a set gains a new member, the domain controller
may choose to invite the incoming device to the do-
main by initiating OMA’s Join Domain protocol. The
human user of the device may veto the invitation if he
or she does not wish the device to become a member.
If a set loses a member, the domain controller can
ask the outgoing device to leave the domain by ini-
tiating OMA’s Leave Domain protocol. It may not
be possible to force the device to leave the domain
immediately, however, since the OMA specification
requires that the user of a device be able to veto a
request to leave a domain, or the device may have
gone off-line. Users can, however, be encouraged to
leave domains by being refused any further service
until they come back on-line and leave the domain
voluntarily.
The human user of a device can also request to
join or leave a domain by initiating the Join or Leave
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Domain protocol from the device’s side. If the user
requests his or her device to join a domain, the do-
main controller checks that the device is a member of
the corresponding set. If it is, the domain controller
may permit the device to join the domain. Other-
wise, the request is rejected. Note that the domain
controller may refuse to admit a device to a domain
for its own reasons, even if the device satisfies the
membership criterion for the domain.
We will now consider how different elements of the
model proposed in Section 3 can be implemented us-
ing this architecture.
6.1 Simple Criteria
It is straightforward to implement the simple criteria
suggested in Section 5.2.1 so long as the ubiquitous
computing network is able to report the relevent con-
text information to the domain controller. In some
cases – such as obtaining the current time or obtain-
ing the current number of devices in a domain – this
is trivial.
Verification of criteria such as spatial, network
and payment is somewhat more involved. Many sys-
tems have been developed for locating devices and ac-
cepting electronic payment, and many of these could
be incorporated into our system. We will not consider
these systems in detail here.
6.2 Domain Criteria
OMA does not define any way in which a rights issuer
(domain controller) can query a device about which
domains it already belongs to. However, since de-
vices can only join and leave a domain by interacting
with that domain’s controller, it is straightforward
for each domain controller to maintain a list of all of
the members of all the domains that it manages.
If a domain licence contains a domain criterion, the
domain controller of the target domain must query
the domain controller of the specified domain as to
whether or not the target device is a member of that
domain. This may require the domain controller of
the target domain to consult some register of domain
controllers in order to locate the controller of the
specified domain. There are several straightforward
ways in which this might be implemented and we will
not consider the details of such a register here.
6.3 Role Domains
OMA does not provide any support for authenticat-
ing the user of a device, so it is not immediately ob-
vious how role domains might be implemented. One
approach, however, is to implement personal domains
by issuing a domain licence with a count criterion of
one. In this way, only one device (presumably the one
that is currently in use by the user) may be active in
the domain at any one time.
In order to prevent attackers from enrolling their
own devices in the user’s domain, the master rights is-
suer must choose domain identifiers that are difficult
to guess, and users must keep their domain identifiers
secret. Identifiers of this sort could be produced, for
example, by having the master rights issuer choose
unique plaintext identifiers and encrypting these us-
ing a secret key in order to produce ciphertext iden-
tifiers assigned to users.
Given that personal domains have been imple-
mented in this way, role domains can be implemented
by issuing domain licences whose membership crite-
rion includes a domain criterion listing all of the per-
sonal domain identifiers of the members of that role.
Using this technique, it is not necessary for the do-
main expression language to explicitly support the
group and individual criteria we suggested in Sec-
tion 5.2.3.
6.4 Retention
OMA does not require that domain rights objects and
content be deleted when leaving a domain. These
rights objects and content will become immediately
re-available when the device re-joins the domain at a
later time.
While there is no method of preventing users from
deleting rights objects, OMA requires that devices
implement a simple replay protection mechanism
that prevents users from deleting rights objects with
exhausted stateful constraints and re-installing the
original unexhausted rights object.
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As we can see no way of implementing a retention
criterion in OMA, and users are prevented from ille-
gitimately restoring stateful rights objects by OMA’s
replay protection specification, we will consider all
rights objects and associated state to be kept indefi-
nitely.
6.5 Stateful Constraints
OMA devices support only unshared stateful con-
straints. In order to implement shared stateful con-
straints using OMA devices, we must assume that
master rights issuers can issue domain controllers
with master rights objects that permit domain con-
trollers to maintain state information on behalf of the
domains that they can control. Such master rights
objects must be written in a language more powerful
than OMA REL that we will not discuss here.
OMA REL supports three stateful constaints,
called count, timed-count and accumulated.
Shared versions of these constraints can be imple-
mented by having the domain controller divide the
state information from the master rights object into
quanta that can be issued to domain members as nor-
mal rights objects:
Count. Every time a device wishes to exercise a
right, the domain controller must issue it with
a rights object containing a count constraint of
one, and decrease the count remaining in the
master rights object by one.
Timed-count. The timed-count constraint is sim-
ilar to the count constraint, but allows the de-
vice to play the content for a specified time pe-
riod without decrementing the counter. To im-
plement a shared version, the domain controller
may issue as many rights objects as it wishes con-
taining an accumulated constraint equal to the
timer value – that is, devices may play the con-
tent for the specified time period with restraint.
Devices that want to play the content for longer
periods must obtain a one-count rights object as
for the count constraint.
Accumulated. Whenever a device wishes to exer-
cise a right, the domain controller must issue it
with a rights object containing an accumulat-
ed constraint with some value less than that re-
maining in the master rights object. The time
remaining in the master rights object must be
decremented by the amount of time awarded to
the device.
More sophisticated approaches to shared stateful
constraints are possible using more advanced proto-
cols than those defined by OMA [14]. We cannot see
any way of implementing such protocols using stan-
dard OMA devices, however.
7 Conclusion
There are many situations in which multimedia works
are legitimately shared between a number of different
users and/or multimedia terminals. Existing digital
rights management systems, however, provide only
very primitive support for sharing behaviours. We
have proposed to marry the existing notions of an
“authorised domain” and an “environment role” to
provide flexible but controllable sharing of access to
valuable digital content. Using sharing-oriented busi-
ness models and concepts from ubiquitous comput-
ing, it may be possible to achieve content sharing
that is virtually invisible except to those who would
share without limit.
The power and flexibility of a system implemented
in our model depends to a large extent on the lan-
guage used for composing domain licences. We have
proposed a domain expression language based on the
Open Digital Rights Language that includes a num-
ber of useful domain criteria. Our language is a pre-
liminary proposal, however, and we expect that it
could be refined by further examination of business
models and scenarios.
We have demonstrated the practicality of our
model by outlining how it could be implemented us-
ing OMA domains and ubiquitous computing. Our
model increases the expressive power of OMA’s dig-
ital rights management specification without requir-
ing end-user devices to be upgraded.
Using standard devices, however, has a number of
drawbacks compared to what could be achieved us-
ing upgraded devices that support more sophisticated
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approaches to key management and communication
within a domain. We will leave the development of
such approaches as future work.
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